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CREDIT ADAIINISTRATION AND WAGE EARNER
BANKRUPTCIES
WESLEY A. STURGESt AND DON E. COOPERtf
BANKRUPTCIES, more than ever and bigger than ever, have followed
our credit administration of the past decade. In 1921 our total
technical bankrupts were officially reported at 15,200.1 In 1931, this
number reached 60,322.2 Outstanding in this history are wage and
salary earners. 3 In numbers, wage and salary earner bankruptcies
increased from 5,928 in 1921 to 29,814 in 1931.4 Whereas they con-
stituted 39 per cent of the total of our bankrupts in 1921, that ratio
had increased to 49 per cent in 1931. In other words, in 1931 almost
one-half of our technical bankrupts were wage and salary earners.
Furthermore, there is evidence to support the conclusion that a
greater percentage of "no-assets" estates is found in our wage and
salary earners' bankruptcies than in any other class of bankrupts.
Thus, the bankruptcy records for the fiscal year 1930 have been
analyzed to show that 84.90 per cent of the estates of wage and salary
earners in bankruptcy had no assets and that 98.17 per cent of those
estates had assets per estate of less than $500 in value.5 It may also
be observed that all but a small fraction of our wage and salary
earner bankruptcies are instituted by a voluntary petition. In 1921,
there were 31 involuntary petitions among the 5,928 wage and salary
tLines Professor of Law, Yale University. See the author's CASES ON Cnnrr
TRANSACTIONS (1930) and CASES ON ADmINISTRATION OF DEBTons' ESTATE3
(1933).
jResearch Assistant in the Yale School of Law.
1. REP. A 'r'y GEN. (1921). These reports are for the fiscal year of the
Federal Government which ends June 30th.
2. Id. (1931).
3. For the purposes of this paper consideration is given primarily to
the implications of wage and salary earner bankruptcies. It should be re-
marked, however, that the general theme of the article and the legislation
herein advocated to aid in consumer credit management are considered as
also applicable, to a large extent, to commercial credit management generally,
including farm credit.
4. Supra notes 1 and 2.
5. Strengthening of Procedure in the Judicial System, Sen. Doc. No. 65,
'72d Congress, 1st Session, 1932, including Report to the President on the
Bankruptcy Act and its Administration in the Courts of the United States.
The following analysis is set out on page 7:
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earner bankruptcies; 5,897 were voluntary petitions.0 In 1931 there,
were 116 involuntary petitions among the 29,814 wage and salary
earner bankruptcies. 7 In common with all bankruptcies, discharges
are freely granted: "98 per cent of the mercantile bankrupts and
about 991/t per cent of the non-mercantile bankrupts who seek dis-,
charges are granted them outright." 8 These percentages have been
"practically constant since the earliest days of the act [Bankruptcy
Act, 1898] despite the gradual addition of new grounds for denying-
a discharge." 9
Information upon the net loss to creditors of wage and salary
earner bankrupts is not very adequate. There is, however, basis for
the statement that the aggregate of the debts per wage or salary
earner bankrupt is not as great as in the other classes of bankrupts.
"An analysis of the wage-earner bankruptcies closed in the fiscal year
1930 in the 10 districts having the largest number of these bank-
ruptcies revealed that at least 12 per cent of these wage-earners had
debts of under $250; that at least 12 per cent had debts of from $250,
to $500; and that at least 25 per cent had debts of from $500 to.
$1,000. Thus, in about half the cases (and for the reasons stated in
the statistical analysis at page 197 the proportion is probably higher)
the debts were $1,000 or less. In at least another 24 per cent of the
cases the debts were from $1,000 to $2,000; so that, all told, nearly
three-fourths of these bankrupts owed from $2,000 on down." 10
Naturally enough, and properly so, commercial, credit and financial
interests have manifested general alarm at this rising tide of bank-
ruptcies and credit losses. Why, they question, may debtors so freely
legally repudiate their obligations? Answer: Because the Bank-
ruptcy Act so provides. Then, it is replied, the Act must be amended
and the sanctity of contract restored.
Noncommercial bankruptcies, per cent of cases within each asset group.
Total number
Fiscal year No $1 to $101 to $250 to Total less of cases
1930 assets $100 $250 $500 than $500 occupationally,
Wage earners 84.90 9.46 2.70 1.11 98.17 27,929
Farmers . .. 66.73 6.79 4.85 3.48 81.85 4,871
Professional
men ...... 66.32 12.86 5.38 3.66 88.22 1,283
Others ..... 67.84 7.87 5.00 4.02 84.73 10,400
Total ........................................................ 43,983*
*Dismissed cases are excluded.
6. Supra note 1.
7. Supra note 2.
8. Op. cit. s2tpra note 5, at 12.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 82, 197.
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To meet the demand to save the foundations of oar credit structure
from this menacing, ever-rising tide of bankruptcies, extensive amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act have been recommended to Congress
by the Attorney General of the United States." These amendments,
at least for the most part, are sponsored by substantial commercial,
credit and financial interests of the country.
Some Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act
What do our commercial, credit and financial interests demand in
the premises? What do they consider feasible to be done to the Bank-
ruptcy Act and its administration, in order adequately to deal with
our wage and salary earner bankrupts? What is the Executive De-
partment of the United States Government prepared to approve and
recommend to Congress with respect to our wage and salary earner
bankrupts?
Before reviewing the proposed amendments which most directly
relate to wage and salary earner bankrupts, certain proposed amend-
ments of more general application may be briefly noticed. These
amendments are, for the most part, predicated upon the conclusion
that creditors' coSperation in bankruptcy proceedings under the
present law is almost non-existent.13 Creditors do not attend creditors'
meetings provided for in the Act; they will not concern themselves
to determine the election of the trustee for the estate; they will not
concern themselves to investigate the history of the bankrupt's activ-
ities, even the immediate antecedents of his bankruptcy; they are
not inclined to attempt to investigate the existence or disposition of
assets, or to discover whether or not assets have been disposed of
wrongfully as to them. Neither do they appear to challenge the
granting of the bankrupt's application for discharge. In short, gen-
erally speaking, all that creditors are inclined to do about their
bankrupt's estate is to wish that they may receive a check for their
claims. From experience and very real tradition, they realize that,
under existing administration at least, probably they will receive
no check, or at the most, scarcely enough to pay the cost of filing a
claim-and why should good money be spent upon a dead horse? 14
11. Supra note 5; Senate Bill No. 3866, 72d Congress, 1st Session, 1932.
12. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 43-49.
13. Id. at 14 et seq; DONOVAN, ADmINISTRATION op BAmuPr EsTATEn
(House Committee Print, 71st Congress, 3d Session, 1931) 4, 5, 13, 22.
14. "Mr. Garrison. Let me give you the figures on the dividends paid to
general creditors only.
"Senator Hastings. That is after the expense.
"Mr. Garrison. Yes.
"In 1923 they were a little over 7% per cent., and beginning with 1923, run-
ning down to 1931, there was a tendency toward a decrease of that, so that by
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These amendments attempt to substitute administrative for creditor
control, as follows: (1) Salaried officials, to be known as Examiners,.
are to be appointed under civil service regulations to function in aid
of the referees. They shall examine the debtor or bankrupt and his
affairs with a view to discovering assets and whether or not there are
causes to deny or to suspend his discharge. Their findings shall be
reported to the referee for his consideration. "In those cases in which
the bankrupt's failure has been a simple one and an honest one the
examination by the examiner would be short and devoted simply to
bringing out the facts. If, on the other hand, there were any evi-
dences of irregularity, the examiner would be expected, and would
have the means, to make a thorough inquiry. He could conduct
examinations under section 21 (a). He could go over the books and
records and check them against the statement of affairs, and so
on." 15 (2) Provision is made for the creation and maintenance of a
roster of "authorized" trustees in each district who shall be available
for election or appointment as trustee of bankrupt estates. This
roster shall be made up of applicants who have been investigated for
their general qualifications to act as trustees and who have been
approved by the court.16 (3) Provision is also made for salaried
officials who are designated in the proposed amendments as Admin-
istrators. There shall be ten of these officials whose duties shall be
generally to supervise, in as many districts, the new bankruptcy
administration. They shall supervise the actions of the Examiners,
investigate applicants for the position of "authorized" trustee and
shall report to the court of the district upon general matters concern-
ing administration within the district.1 (4) Referees are to be placed
upon salary and their powers substantially enlarged-including the
important one of passing upon applications for discharge.18 Trustees
remain upon a fee basis, but their fees shall be computed on the basis
of amounts paid to creditors rather than, as now, upon the gross
estate.' 9
Whether or not this new Federal, salaried officialdom might ac-
complish the results anticipated by its proponents it is not proposed
the time you reach the fiscal year 1931, the percentage paid general creditors
was 5 per cent. on their claims. It runs on an average for those nine fiscal years
a little over 6 per cent." Statement of Lloyd K. Garrison, Special Assistant
to the Attorney-General, at Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 72d Congress, 1st Session, on Senate Bill No. 3866
(April 12-13, 1932) p. 10.
15. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 94 et seq.
16. Id. at 107 et seq.
17. Id. at 104 et seq.
18. Id. at 123 et seq.
19. Id. at 111.
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to discuss.20  It may be e-xpected, however, that the "efficiency" of
these officials would be measured, primarily, at least, by two consid-
20. In so far as the experience of the Irving Trust Company, as standing
Receiver in Bankruptcy for the Southern District of New York, may be re-
garded as an indication of the feasibility of this proposed organization of bank-
ruptcy officials, the recently released report of the trust company should chal-
lenge interest. The following table, which speaks for itself, is taken from the
report (page 114):
ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS GROUPED ACCORDING TO N r RnzE
AssETs, CONCLUDED BY IRVING TRUST COMPANY JANUARY 16, 1929
TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1932
Percentage of






















































*NOTE-The marked extent to which this experience conforms to the usual
experience may be seen by comparing the percentage of all cases, by groups,
shown above, with the figures shown at p. 206 of "The Report of the Attorney
General on Bankruptcy Law and Practice," (Senate Document No. 65, 72nd
Congress, 1st Session, 1932) where almost identical percentages are given for
the same size groups excluding "no asset" cases) as to all cases concluded in the




















































The percentage of dividends paid to general creditors upon unsecured claims as






erations: (1) increase of dividends to creditors; (2) decrease of
discharges. Such standards would necessarily place a premium upon
methods oppressive of debtors and upon technical attacks upon
creditors with respect to claims which they sought to prove.
Turning to proposals which relate especially to wage and salary
earners, we find that a new section (numbered 75)21 is proposed for
addition to the Act. Its express purpose is to minimize the pressure
of collection proceedings, in aid of a debtor desiring to pay.
A debtor wage earner who is "insolvent or unable to meet his debts
as they mature" may petition a bankruptcy court to surrender his
non-exempt property, if any he has, for the account of his debts, and
to amortize the unpaid balance of his liabilities from future property
and, or, earnings. Upon approval of the petition, the court shall
order amortization payments "in accordance with his capacity to
pay." Such petitioner may extend his amortization over a period of
two years and then petition his discharge from such part of his debts
as remain unpaid.
If the court is "satisfied that the debtor's petition was in good faith,
and that his inability to complete the payments was due to circum-
stances for which he could not justly be held responsible," he shall
be discharged (75 c). A wage earner filing such a voluntary petition
to amortize his debts is classified as a "debtor," and not as a "bank-
rzupt." This classification, it is thought, will be inviting to the em-
barrassed but honest debtor to invoke these proceedings to gain a
moratorium from garnishments or other collection proceedings, and,
avoiding the "stigma of bankruptcy," to undertake for the prescribed
period of two years to liquidate his obligations from future earnings
in so far as he can do so during that period and thereby and therefor
receive at the end of the period a discharge unless cause is found to
deny it. This procedure would be available to a given debtor wage
earner, however, only once in seven years (75 d).22
The moratorium, moreover, shall not prevent creditors "whose
claims were not provable in the proceedings or arose subsequent to
the filing of the petition from pursuing such remedies for the en-
forcement of their claims against the debtor and such of his property,
the title to which has not vested in the trustee, as they would have
had if proceedings under this section had not been instituted" (75 e).
8.06 per cent. Report at 22-23. For purposes of comparison with the usual
experience in this regard see the statement of Lloyd K. Garrison, supra note 14.
21. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 77 et seq.
22. The proposed subsection actually reads as follows: "(d) No petition
may be filed under the provisions of this section by a debtor who has within
six years previously filed such a petition or been granted a discharge."
[Vol. 42.
CREDIT ADMINISTRATION
The following question naturally arises in connection with this
proposed new section: What is the position of the wage or salary
earner if he does not invoke the procedure of the new section? He
may become a voluntary bankrupt. The examiner shall investigate
his affairs, examine him and submit his findings to the referee who
shall have these findings before him in passing upon the bankrupt's
application for discharge. Elaborate amendments, however, of the
discharge section of the present Act will affect him as a voluntary
bankrupt. 2 His application for a discharge may be granted, sus-
pended or denied. Discharge shall be denied, as now, for causes
set forth in present section 14 b.24 Suspended discharge shall be
ordered for a period not exceeding two years from the date of the
order, if the court "is satisfied from such evidence as has been ad-
duced (1) that the assets of the bankrupt at the commencement of
the proceedings were not of a value equal to 50 cents on the dollar of
the amount of his provable debts, unless he satisfies the court that
such fact has been due to circumstances for which he can not justly
be held responsible; or (2) that he contracted any provable debt
within four months prior to the commencement of the proceedings
without having at the time of contracting it any reasonable or prob-
able ground of expectation of being able to pay it; or (3) that he
has brought on, or contributed to, his bankruptcy by rash and hazard-
ous speculations or by unjustifiable extravagance in living, or by
gambling or by culpable neglect of .his business affairs" (14 d).
During the suspension of a discharge the bankrupt shall be required
to turn over his non-exempt property and all such property as is
acquired during the suspension, including all income "excepting a
reasonable allowance for the living necessities of himself and his
dependents" (14 e). Upon the expiration of the suspension period,
the court, "if satisfied from the trustee's report and from the reports
of the bankrupt submitted by the trustee, and from further examin-
ation of the bankrupt as any officer or party in interest may make,
that the bankrupt has endeavored in good faith and to the extent
of his ability to comply with the terms of the order of suspension,
shall grant a discharge. If not so satisfied, after giving him a reason-
able opportunity to be heard, the court shall deny the discharge"
(14 e). If the discharge is not denied or suspended as herein provided
is shall be granted (14 f). If a discharge is suspended under this
section, the suspension "shall not be deemed to affect the rights of
creditors whose claims were not provable in the proceedings or arose
23. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 96 et seq.
24. Subsection b of present section 14 would be changed but comparatively
little. In the proposed amendments it appears as subsection c.
1933]
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subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings from pursuing
such remedies for the enforcement and collection of their claims
,against the bankrupt and such of his property, the title to which has
not vested in the trustee, as they would have had if the discharge had
not been suspended" (14 b).
Very briefly summarized, these are the proposals which our com-
mercial, credit and financial interests deem feasible; such are the
recommendations of the Executive Department of the United States
Government for dealing with our wage and salary earner debtors
and bankrupts.
In short, these proposals may be said to have two main purposes,
as follows: (1) To assist once in seven years a debtor, insolvent or
unable to meet his debts as they mature, for a two-year period to
amortize his debts by providing a moratorium against collection
remedies of existing creditors having provable claims. If there is
an unpaid balance at'the end of the two years, the court shall grant
a discharge if the court is satisfied that the debtor's petition to
amortize was made in good faith, and that his inability to pay in full
is due to circumstances for which he could not justly be held re-
sponsible. (2) A second main purpose of these proposals is to aid
creditors to collect a greater percentage of their claims by more
strenuous attempts to discover assets for the bankrupt's estate and
to suspend discharges for a period of two years so that future ac-
quired property and income in excess of the bankrupt's living neces-
sities may be appropriated to existing obligations.
Relation of Bankruptcy Administration and Credit Management
In view of the fact that these proposals relate primarily to proceed-
ings at the time and place of dissolution and liquidation of credit
grants-to proceedings at Bankruptcy and the mechanics of bank-
ruptcy administration-no attempt will be made to criticize or to
commend them. Whether or not wage and salary earner debtors
would be "attracted" or "compelled" to an amortization plan like
that contemplated by new section 75 will not be discussed. Whether
or not wage and salary earner debtors or bankrupts would be found
financially able t6 amortize any substantial percentage of their debts
under the proposed amendments will not be discussed. Probably some
would and probably some would not.21 Whether or not the Federal
courts, with the proposed new officials, should, under guise of their
25. See conclusions by Douglas, based on studies of wage earner bankrupts
in Boston and New Jersey, in Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal
Control (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 591, 626-638.
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Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, be put into this business of collecting small
claims, assuming that some should prove collectible under the proposed
plan, will not be considered.
206
In lieu of such considerations, it is proposed to examine the broader
economic implications of our wage and salary earner bankruptcies,
to question the effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Act or its adminis-
tration adequately to solve the credit problems implicit in these bank-
ruptcies and to outline remedies seemingly more adequate to deal
with those problems.
In approaching these propositions let us first return to the bank-
ruptcy records reported at the beginning of this article to note that
there are at least some mitigating factors with respect to the fore-
going report of the increasing number of wage and salary earner
bankruptcies which deserve mention. The reported increase of these
bankrupts may be accounted for to some small degree by the increase
in population during the period in question (the national increase
being 16.1 per cent from 1920 to 1930),27 and by the migration of
rural people to and concentration in our industrial centers during at
least the greater part of the same period.28 Again, as business
failures generally have increased during the period in question, so
may we conclude that, to some extent, an increasing number of
"wage-earners," as officially chronicled in bankruptcy reports, have
been former business proprietors who failed in business and went
into bankruptcy after becoming wage earners because of their debts
incurred in conducting a business..2 9 More significant still is the fact
of the increase in the number of "business failures," because, in most
cases probably, they were "employer failures," and involved dis-
placement of employees. Bradstreet's reports the total "business
26. Those who have warned of the increasing volume of business in the
federal courts (see e.g., Frankfurter and Landis, The Busincss of the Supreme
Court (1927) 40 HAnv. L. Rsv. 834, 871; (1929) 43 id. 33 et passim; Frank-
furter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 504 et seq.) as well as those who seek
affirmatively to restrict their jurisdiction (see e.g., the Norris Bill to abolish
diversity jurisdiction, SEN. REP. No. 691 (1930), commented upon in (1930)
44 HARV. L. REv. 97; Newlin, Proposed Limitations Upon Our Federal Courts
(1929) 15 A.B.A. J. 401 (discussion, not always favorable, of certain pro-
posals to restrict the functions of the federal judiciary)) should be challenged
by this feature of the proposed amendments of the Bankruptcy Act. Opposition
to this proposed officialdom and to the entire bill has been voiced by Isaac,
Should the Federal Government Establish a Bankruptcy Bureau? (1932) 8
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 26.
27. U. S. Census Reports, Bureau of the Census (1932).
28. See I RECENT SocIAL TRENDs (1933) 8 et seq.
29. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 197; Douglas, op. cit. supra note 25, at 613.
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failures" for 1931 at 26,381.0 For purposes of interpreting this
figure, a "business failure" is defined by Bradstreet's as "suspension
of business activity by an individual, firm or corporation in ordinary
commercial operation, where there is an actual loss to creditors."
Under this classification failure by professional men, such as physi-
cians, lawyers and actors, farmers, independent artisans, housewives
and housekeepers, as well as brokers and real estate agents who are
not recognized as established firms, is excluded. On the other hand
the statistics do include suspension of banks and other strictly
financial institutions, even if the suspension prove only temporary." a1
In order to gain an aggregate for 1931 of failures of business pro-
prietorships which probably involved some displacement of employ-
ment and loss of wage and salary earnings, we may add to Brad-
street's "business failures" (26,381) the officially reported bank-
ruptcies of farmers (4,026)22 and of professional persons (1,293) 11
for the same year. In short, for the year 1931, it may be concluded
that there were approximately 31,700 "employer failures." 84 By
the same token, there was less than one technically bankrupt wage
or salary earner per "employer-failure" in 1931. 85
These extenuating factors are mentioned that attention may be
directed to the proposition that the wage and salary earner bank-
ruptcies are, at least to large extent, symptomatic of more compre-
hensive problems of economic and credit management than matters
of administration of the Bankruptcy Act, and, accordingly, that we
may be doubtful from the start if amendment of the Bankruptcy
30. BRAsmTREEr's FAILURE STATISTICS FOR 1931 (1932) 6.
31. Id. at 4.
32. REP. ATT'Y GEN. (1931).
33. Ibid.
34. Obviously, some license has been taken in arriving at these respective
totals for, among other things, the bankruptcy records are for the fiscal year
1931, while Bradstreet's are for the calendar year 1931. This, however, would
not seem to be very important for present purposes.
35. Of course, it is not intended to imply a diffusion of wage and salary
earner bankrupts according to these probable "employer-failures." It is in-
tended merely by these statistics to make plausible what probably most people
would believe anyhow, that is, that there is loss of employment and wages
which may well be a "contributing factor" in some wage earner bankruptcies.
Precise percentages in this connection are not deemed necessary for present
purposes.
And of course it must also be recognized that science exacts its toll of
unemployment and loss of wages and salary which is much more widely diffused
than that resulting from "employer-failures." And of the future, see STUART
CHASE, TECHNOCRACY, AN INTERPRETATION (1933); ARERIGHT, THE A,13. C. OF




Act is an adequate remedy. Clearly, it may be suspected that the pro-
posed bankruptcy reforms promise little in this connection; that com-
mercial, credit and financial interests and the Attorney General are
over-simplifying the economic problems implicit in the chronicles of
our wage and salary earner bankruptcies by over-consideration of
bankruptcy records, the Bankruptcy Act and its administration.
Let us follow this thought into an analysis of the official bank-
ruptcy records, showing, in numbers, the experiences of the several
states with bankruptcies during the years 1921-1931.cG At first
sight one is impressed with the variations of mathematical totals
which appear-variations in one state as compared with another in
total number of bankruptcies in a given year, and variations in ratio
of wage earner bankruptcies to total bankruptcies in one state as
compared with another. It seems impossible, after comparatively
examining these varying records, to conclude that they are responsive
to any one or more factors which inhere in the Bankruptcy Act or
its administration. Instead, one concludes about as follows: That,
in so far as Bankruptcy administration is concerned, as long as there
are debts and debtors, bankruptcy proceedings and discharges in
bankruptcy, there will be bankrupts. That, in so far as Bank-
ruptcy administration is concerned, as long as there are more
and more debtors, there may be more and more petitioners in
bankruptcy. That even if provisions for discharge were removed
from the Bankruptcy Act, there would be more or less "bank-
rupt" debtors accordiig to the volume and diffusion of credit.
That measures, such as amendments of the Bankruptcy Act, designed
to minimize the number of technical bankrupts will not check any
substantial percentage of our defaulting debtors. Moreover,
studies of the bankruptcy records of the several states should
not isolate us from matters of general knowledge, namely, that these
records are reports upon only a part of our total debtors and their
debts, and that these records reveal not at all the near infinite varieties
of circumstances under which debts are incurred or the near infinite
variety of changing conditions affecting the several debtors subsequent
to the date of incurring their obligations. These unreported facts
are, of course, the intervention of the complex fortuities of life-
some of which we know as misfortune, disease, unemployment, ex-
travagance, dishonesty, and which have a most direct impact upon
savings, incomes and debts.
With these cautions, we may turn to the more detailed review of
the bankruptcy records of the several states. What matters of Bank-
ruptcy reform do they suggest? Looking at a table of the records
36. REPs. ATr'Y GN. (1921-1931).
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of all the states for the years 1921-1931, the figures for certain states
appear distinctive for their size. Those with one thousand or more
wage earner bankrupts in 1931 catch the eye. Let us note those













































































































It may be observed that Alabama (with a population in 1930 of
2,646,248) 37 had a greater number of wage earner bankruptcies in
1931 than any other state in the group-greater than Illinois (with
a population of 7,630,654 in 1930),8s greater than Massachusetts
37. U. S. Census Reports for 1930. It is interesting to note that porhapu
the most impassioned plea made'in the hearings upon the amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act as proposed by the Attorney-General, opposing the provinoni
for amortization by wage earners (§ 75 proposed), and suspension of dis-
charges, was made by Edmund H. Dryer, Esq., of Birmingham, Alabama, and
Referee in Bankruptcy for over twenty years. See Part 3, Joint Hearings
Before the Subcommittees of the Committee on the Judiciary on Senate Bill
No. 3866 (72d Congress, 1st Session) 617 et seq.
38. U. S. Census Reports for 1930.
1
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(with a population of 4,249,614 in 1930),39 greater than New York
(with a population of 12,588,066 in 1930) ,40 greater than Ohio (with
a population of 6,646,697 in 1930).41 Concededly, this fact suggests
the existence of varying, highly complex backgrounds of credit,
economic, legal and social factors. But what of it for purposes of
one or more Bankruptcy reforms?
It may be observed that the wage earner figures for Ohio for 1931
almost equal the total of Massachusetts and New York. But what
Bankruptcy reform is suggested by this fact?
In terms of ratio of wage earner bankruptcies to total bankruptcies,
Alabama is the only state of the group which had a lower ratio in
1931 than in 1921. But of this observation, as well as those made
above, and many other mathematical deductions which might be made
from the foregoing table, the question recurs: How do they prompt
Bankruptcy reforms?
If we turn to the states having the lowest records for wage earner
bankruptcies, selecting, arbitrarily again, those states which did not
have in excess of 100 wage earner bankruptcies in 1931, there would
be the following table:
TABLE II.
1921
STATE Population Total Wage Per
(1920) Bankruptcies Earners Cent
Arizona ...................... 334,162 21 9 42.8
Arkansas ..................... 1,752,204 163 31 19.01
Delaware ..................... 223,003 20 1 5.0
District of Columbia ........... 437,571 35 5 14.28
Florida ....................... 968,470 111 2 1.8
Idaho ........................ 431,866 80 37 40.25
Maryland ..................... 1,449,661 84 12 1428
Nevada ....................... 77,407 11 4 36.36
New Hampshire ............... 443,083 53 20 37.7
New Mexico ................... 360,350 20 6 30.0
North Carolina ................ 2,559,123 63 1 1.53
North Dakota ................. 646,872 146 22 15.06
Rhode Island .................. 604,397 50 16 31.0
South Carolina ................ 1,683,724 58 3 5.17
South Dakota ................. 636,547 76 14 18.4
Texas ........................ 4,663,228 383 38 9.92
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1931
STATM Population Total Wage PCr
(1980) Bankruptcies Earners Cent
Arizona ...................... 435,573 71 24 83.8
Arkansas ..................... 1,854,482 323 52 16.09
Delaware ..................... 238,380 59 5 8.47
District of Columbia ........... 486,869 136 63 46.8
Florida ....................... 1,468,211 613 31 5.05
Idaho ........................ 445,032 186 52 27.9
Maryland ..................... 1,631,526 340 39 11.47
Nevada ...................... 91,058 52 15 28.8
New Hampshire ............... 465,293 84 42 50.0
New Mexico ................... 423,317 55 18 32.7
North Carolina ................ 3,170,276 584 18 3.08
North Dakota ................. 680,845 205 45 21.9
Rhode Island .................. 687,497 200 80 40.0
South Carolina ................ 1,738,765 167 10 5.98
South Dakota ................. 692,849 240 61 25.4
Texas ........................ 5,824,715 929 58 0.24
Wyoming ..................... 225,565 58 42 72.4
What is there in Bankruptcy law or practice to account for the
largest (territorially) state and the smallest appearing in this second
grouping? What of it, for purposes of Bankruptcy reforms, that,
in 1931, each state of the first group had more wage earner bankrupt-
cies than the aggregate of all of the states of the second group?
In terms 'of "factors" such as geographical location, personnel of
population, balance of urban and rural population, business and
commercial pursuits, there seems to be no evidence upon which to
conclude that variations in the ever-increasing number of technical
bankruptcies in these several states and in the ratio of wage and
salary earner bankruptcies to total bankruptcies point to any par-
ticular reforms in the Bankruptcy Law or its administration.
In terms of gross population, concededly the total population of
the first group of states listed above, is greater than that of the sec-
ond group. Concededly, also, population in the first group of states
-is more highly concentrated in urban and industrial centers than
in the second group of states. But what of these differences, however
substantial, as a basis upon which to predicate bankruptcy reforms?
In so far as Bankruptcy administration is concerned, more debtors, to
repeat, may be expected to mean a greater number of bankrupts.
In so far as Bankruptcy administration is concerned, more wage
and salary earner debtors may be expected to yield more wage and
salary earner bankruptcies as wage and salary earner volume of
credit is expanded and diffused. On the other hand, amendments
of the Bankruptcy Act restricting discharges would restrict bank-
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ruptey discharges, as repeal of the Bankruptcy Act would eliminate
technical bankruptcies-but not debtors bankrupt in fact.
Carrying this analysis to a group of contiguous states, let us ob-
serve the records of the six New England States, as set forth below.
TABLE IM.
1921
STATE Population Total Wage Per
(1920) Bandkruptcies Earnwrs Cent
Maine ........................ 768,014 420 276 65.7
Vermont ...................... 352,428 85 49 57.6
New Hampshire .............. 443,083 53 20 37.7
Massachusetts ................ 3,852,356 728 245 33.7
Rhode Island .................. 604,397 50 16 31.0
Connecticut ................... 1,380,631 138 7 5.07
1931
STATE Population Total Wago Per
(1930) Bankruptcies Earners Ccnt
Maine ........................ 797,423 869 609 70.08
Vermont ...................... 359,611 210 119 56.6
New Hampshire ............... 465,293 84 42 50.0
Massachusetts ................. 4,249,614 2622 1153 43.9
Rhode Island .................. 687,497 200 80 40.0
Connecticut ................... 1,606,903 534 241 45.1
There were fewer wage earner bankruptcies in the whole of New
England in 1931 than in either Alabama, Ohio or Tennessee. Does
the Bankruptcy Act, or its administration especially favor New
England, or unduly prejudice Alabama, Ohio and Tennessee? What
Bankruptcy reforms could be capable of improving wage and salary
earner credit in New England? What reforms of the Bankruptcy
Act would aid in removing these diversities of bankruptcy totals?
This brief review of some gross totals of bankruptcies, their
variations in several states and this questioning as to whether or not
the varying totals point to needed Bankruptcy reform is indulged to
challenge the popular practice of predicating the necessity of such
reform upon the fact that we have a large number of bankruptcies
and that their totals for the country are increasing year by year.4'
For purposes of alarm and focusing attention, this practice of quoting
42. See, for example, Message of the President to the Senate and House
of Representatives, February 29, 1932; Strengthening of Procedure in the
Judicial System, Sen. Doe. No. 65, 72d Congress, lst Session, at page xl;
DONOVAN, ADMINSTATION Op BANKRUPT ESTATES, op. cit. supra note 13, at 7.
If the present rate of increase should continue the Russel Sage Foundation has
estimated that "one out of every 15 wage-earner families in 1940 -would be
potentially bankrupt, in the bankruptcy courts, or prevented from bankruptcy
by reason of discharge within six years."
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rising totals of bankruptcies with their increasing losses to creditors
may well be effective, but it seems unwarranted to conclude that
totals in the bankruptcy reports are ruled by factors inherent in the
Bankruptcy Act or its administration, or that amendments of the
Bankruptcy Act looking to its more "efficient" administration in
terms of greater dividends for creditors, provide an effective solution
of the credit problems implicit in these bankruptcy records.
There remains, however, to observe one suggestion which fre-
quently recurs as somewhat of an attempt at particularization in
connection with quotations of rising bankruptcy totals and the need of
bankruptcy reform. Suggestion is made, though somewhat indefi-
nitely, of a correlation of collection remedies, bankruptcies and bank-
ruptcy reforms-as if they had some particularly significant mutual
relationship. 43  It would seem very reasonable to conclude that
probably most wage and salary earner bankrupts are driven to
voluntary bankruptcy as apparently the only way out of their debt
burdens, and, as is probably necessary in many cases, in order to
preserve their jobs by responding to their employers' demands that
pending garnishments and assignments of wages be cleaned up. In
other words, quite probably, most of our wage and salary earners
have not gone through Bankruptcy just for the experience, but
instead, compelling collection proceedings have at least contributed
to the decision to file a petition. But these matters cannot be elim-
inated by amending the Bankruptcy Act. Collection remedies and
such reforms of collection procedures as have been accomplished in
the past decade do not explain the ever-increasing number of bank-
ruptcies of that period. This identification of collection remedies as
one of the touching-off "factors" of these bankruptcies indicates no
reforms of the Bankruptcy Act which promise its better adminis-
tration. Even less does it indicate a solution of the problems of
credit management signalized by these bankruptcies. And while, as
is hereafter urged, reform of collection procedures and a cooperative
amendment of the Bankruptcy Act may facilitate a solution of these
problems, the necessary reforms and amendments are not reflected
in an exposition of the impact of collection proceedings upon tech-
nical bankrupts. If collection remedies of the several states were
entirely eliminated, very probably bankruptcies could be cut down;
but such a proposal seems too impracticable further to discuss. And,
at all events, the elimination of these remedies could not be accom-
plished by changes in the Bankruptcy Act or its administration. On
the other hand, if there is need for additional collection remedies,
as such, to aid the creditors of our wage and salary earners, it is
not clear that they can be more adequately provided for by reforms
43. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 81.
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of the Bankruptcy Act than by the several states. 4 Moreover, quite
clear is it that, in the case of wage and salary earners, as dis-
tinguished from manufactarers and merchants, for example, their
sources and lines of credit are local and therefore, there is little
necessity of accommodating out-of-state creditors with the Federal
judicial system.
By -way of more specific consideration of the relation of collection
remedies to and their impact upon wage and salary earner debtors
and their bankruptcies, this question may be posed: Do the collection
remedies of the several states account for their increasing number
of wage and salary earner bankruptcies, or explain or bear upon
the statistical variations of the several states in their respective gross
totals of bankruptcies and wage and salary earner bankruptcies?
In connection with this question, let us turn first to the New
England states with their record of bankruptcies as set forth above
in Table HI. They will be cited first in this connection because it is
believed that the legal collection remedies of those states are most
rigorous toward the debtor and that their allowances of wage and
salary exemptions are least liberal.
The original writ with which civil actions are commenced in this
group of states may be framed so as to include an attachment of the
debtor's property, in every case involving a money demand and
without the necessity of showing any particular statutory ground
therefor.44- In Connecticut garnishment is available as of course "in
any civil action in which a judgment or decree for the payment of
money may be rendered" when "a debt is due from any person to the
44. Of course, under the present Bankruptcy Act, upon the intervention of
proceedings thereunder, the usual collection remedies are supplanted by the
agencies provided for in the statute. The amortization plan recommended by
the Attorney-General, as reviewed above, proposes to extend the operation of
these agencies over a two-year period pending a suspended discharge. As the
Bankruptcy Act is reformed by extending the time for administration and
collections thereunder, there is, of course, possibility that collections will be
greater than in a shorter period. But observe that this is a comparison of
Bankruptcy collections for one period of administration as compared with such
collections for a longer period. It does not point to their superiority over the
ordinary collection remedies which would be available if proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Act had not intervened. In other words, the longer a debtor is
held in Bankruptcy administration and his discharge suspended, theoretically,
at least, the greater may be the collections by Bankruptcy officials from him, but
this proposition does not warrant the conclusion that more 'will be sa collected
than would be collected during like period by ordinary collection remedies out
of Bankruptcy administration.
44a. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5712; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 95, § 2;
MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 223, § 42; N. H. PuB. LAWs (1926) e. 332, § 1;
R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) § 5146; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) § 1701.
1933]
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defendant;" 45 in Maine and Massachusetts all personal actions ex-
cept those of detinue, replevin, actions on the case for malicious
prosecution, slander or libel, and assault and battery may be com-
menced by trustee process (garnishment) ; 46 in New Hampshire any
personal action except replevin may be begun in the same manner; 47
in Rhode Island an original writ commanding the attachment of the
personal estate of the defendant in the hands of any third person
as trustee may be issued on affidavit of the plaintiff that he has a just
claim, that it is due, and that he expects to recover thereon a sum
sufficient to give jurisdiction to the court to which such writ is re-
turnable; 48 and in Vermont all actions founded on contract, express
or implied, and actions for an accounting or on a book account may
be commenced by trustee process.49 And where judgment is rendered
against the defendant in the main action, execution may issue against
any person charged or adjudged as trustee, or against the debts and
credits of the defendant which have been attached in this manner.60t
Wage exemptions 51'range from $10 in Vermont and Rhode Island 6-
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5763. Debts due "at the time of the service
of the foreign attachment" shall be disclosed by the garnishee. Id. § 5768.
46. ME. Ray. STAT. (1930) C. 100, § 1, MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 246, § 1.
In Maine, no person shall be adjudged trustee "by reason of any money
or other thing due from him to the principal defendant, unless at the time of
th6 service of the writ upon him, it is due absolutely and not on any con-
tingency." ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 100, § 55. Similarly, in Massachusetts.
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 246, §§ 10, 24.
47. N. H. PUB. LAws (1926) c. 356, § 1. Debts which become due up to
the time of the trustee's deposition or answer, as well as those which are duo
at the time of the service of the writ upon him are bound. Id. c. 356, § 19.
And see Gove v. Varrell, 58 N. H. 78 (1877).
48. R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 5146. The trustee is required to render an
account in writing, on oath, of what estate of the principal defendant, if any,
he had at the time the writ was issued. Id. § 5211.
49. VT. GuN. LAws (1917) § 1936. "The liability of the person summoned
as trustee is determined according to the state of facts at the time of trial;
so that funds coming into the trustee's hands after the service of the writ are
held, equally with those coming into his hands before that time." Newell v.
Ferris, 16 Vt. 135 (1844). See also, Northfield Trust Co. v. Cutting, 95 Vt.
343, 115 Atl. 289 (1921).
50. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5814; ME. RaV. STAT. (1930) c. 61, § 100;
MASS. GEN. LAwS (1932) c. 246, §§ 39-44; N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 350,
§ 33; R. I. GEN. LAwS (1923) § 5255; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) § 2007.
51. Other exemption provisions, including those for the homestead, personal
property, life insurance, and so on, were examined contemporaneously, but
in order not unduly to extend this discussion they will not be specially con-
sidered. It seems quite clear, however that their inclusion would not have
prejudiced the conclusions here advanced.
52. VT. GEN. LAws (1917) § 1944; R. I. GEN. LAWs (1923) § 5234.
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to $20 in Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire.0 In Rhode
Island and New Hampshire there are no wage exemptions as to claims
for necessaries, and $10 only are exempt in Mlaine and Massachusetts
in such cases.54 $15, except for board and lodging, are exempt in
Connecticut. 55
Turning to the states listed under Tables I and II which will be
considered together, we find that, in the main, attachment and
garnishment are available not as a matter of course, but, expressly
at least,5 6 only upon a showing by affidavit of the existence of certain
specific statutory grounds and upon the posting of a bond usually in
double the amount sought to be recovered 57 and conditioned that the
plaintiff shall pay all damages and costs which the defendant may
sustain in consequence of wrongful issuance.05 With respect to at-
tachment these formal grounds may, with the exception of a few
53. Mn. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 100, § 55 (due for a period not exceeding
one month next preceding the service of process); MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932)
c. 246, § 28; N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 356, § 20.
54. Supra note 53.
55. CONN. GEN STAT. (1930) § 5793 (exception as to rental applies only
where it does not exceed $25).
56. ALA. CODE (1928) §§ 6172-6176; CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. (Deering, 1931)
§§ 537-539; GA. CODE ANN. (1926) §§ 5055-5057; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd,
1931) c. 11, § 1 et seq; Ky. CODEs ANN. (Carroll, 1927) Civ. Prac. §§ 194-
198; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9343 et. scq; N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 902-903, 907;
OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 11819-11821; TENN. CODE (1932) §§ 9396,
9400, 9416, 9418; VA. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 6378-6379, 6384 et scq; Aiz. CODE:
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §§ 4241-4244; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919)
§§ 494-498; DEL. REv. STAT. (1915) § 4118; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 24, § 121
et seq; FLA. CoMiP. LAws (1927) §§ 5255-5259, 5264; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932)
§§ 6-501-D-502; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 9, § 1 et. scq; NEV. Co P.
LAws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 8703-8705; N. Al. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929)
§§ 105-1601-105-1605; N. C. CODE (1931) §§ 798-803; N. D. Coup. LAws ANN.
(1913) §§ 7537-7538, 7543; S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1932) §§ 527-530, 536, 546;
Tnx. REv. CIv. CODE (1928) art. 275-279; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) § 89-3301
et. seq.
The word "expressly" is used in the text in recognition of the fact that the
practice in these states may not uniformly conform to the strict letter of the
statutes. For example, if in a particular state it is accepted practice for
debtors not to contest alleged grounds of attachment, the net result would be
practical nullification of the statutes. But whatever variations in practice
may exist in these states, it is not thought that our conclusions would he
prejudiced.
57. Variations, of course, exist. For example, in California the bond must
be in a sum not exceeding the amount claimed in the action; in North Dakota
it must be at least, and in Arizona not less than, the amount claimed; in New
York it must be at least $250.
58. In Alabama, Arizona and Tennessee the bond is further conditioned
that the plaintiff shall prosecute the action "with effect."
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anomalies 19 be reduced to one: the inadequacy of ordinary process,
various ramifications of which are minutely particularized and spelled
out in the statutes. For example, non-residence of the debtor is
uniformly a sufficient ground for attachment, and other circum-
stances relating to the person of the debtor such as absence from the
state for a specified period, absconding, removing or concealing him-
self to avoid service, frequently recur in the statutes as sufficient
cause.6 0 Another grouping of the several situations in which ordinary
process is deemed inadequate may be classified as relating to the
liable property of the debtor, all of such grounds being, when allow-
ance is made for the variety of expression found in the statutes,
predicated upon the debtor's fraudulent disposition of his property.01
Garnishment as the mode of attaching debts and credits due the
principal defendant, is, as a general proposition, available at the
commencement or during the pendency of suit under the same cir-
,cumstances and upon the same conditions as attachment.02  In Ala-
bama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, New Mexico,
59. For example, fraud on the part of the debtor in contracting the debt
,or incurring the obligation on which the suit is brought is a ground in Illinois.
In California, Idaho, Nevada and Wyoming attachment may issue where the
debt or contract sued upon is unsecured by mortgage, lien or pledge, or if
originally so secured, the security has become valueless, or insufficient, without
act of the plaintiff. And in New Mexico, an attachment may issue where the
debt was incurred for the necessaries of life.
60. Supra note 56.
61. Such grounds embrace various devices through which the debtor may
seek to avoid payment-concealment of his effects; removal of his property
outside the state or jurisdiction of the court; fraudulent conveyances, transfers
and assignments of his property; conversion of his property into money for
the purpose of putting it beyond the reach of creditors. The attachment
statutes not only authorize the seizure of the debtor's property for the actual
.commission of these acts, they also give the plaintiff the power to attach in
order to prevent the intended accomplishment of them.
In Kentucky, in an action on contract, judgment or award, the fact that the
defendant has not property in the state subject to execution sufficient to satisfy
the plaintiff's demand is an attachment ground.
62. E.g. CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 541; DEL. REV. STAT.
<1915) §§ 4118, 4122 et seq; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 24, § 132; IDAHO CODH
ANN. (1932) § 6-509; ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 11, §§ 21, 81;
KY. CbDE ANN. (Carroll, 1927) Civ. Prac. § 194 et seq; MD, ANN. CODE
(Bagby, 1924) art. 9, § 10; Nnv. Comp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 8725; N. 0.
CODE (1931) §§ 817, 819; OHio GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11828; TENN. CODE1
<1932) § 9428; VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 6390 et. seq.
In New York and South Carolina there is no garnishment process as such,
but debts and credits owing to the principal defendant may be reached under
the attachment statutes of those states and held as security for any judgment
the plaintiff may recover. NEW YoRKi C.P.A. § 916 et seq; S. C. CODE OF LAWS
(1932) § 538 et seq.
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North Dakota, South Dakota and Texas, however, while garnishment
is available in any case in which an attachment would issue, creditors,
at least, are not thus restricted, although some form of affidavit, or
bond, or both may be required of them.0 3 And, of course, formal
attachment grounds disappear as prerequisites in all these states
when judgment is recovered against the defendant in the main
action, and garnishment is sought in aid of execution.t" Some form
of affidavit may be required,"5 and in Illinois, Nevada, New York and
Tennessee execution must have been returned unsatisfied, wholly or
in part.6 6 In Kentucky and South Carolina, not only must execution
have been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied, but to reach persons
indebted to the defendant, the judgment creditor must proceed by
way of an equitable action for discovery. 67 Ordinarily, collection of
a judgment through garnishment of wages will necessitate the levying
of successive writs to meet each accruing installment,03 but in New
63. ALA. CODE (1928) § 8051; ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4258; Amr
DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919) § 4906; FLA. ComP. LAws (1927)
§ 5299; GA. CODE ANN. (1926) § 5265 et seq; MINN. STAT. (Supplement, 1931)
§ 9356; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 59-101; N. D. Co LW. LAWS
ANN. (1913) § 7568; S. D. Comp. LAwS (1929) § 2453 ct scq; TE=. REv. CiV.
CoD (1928) art. 4076.
The affidavit required in these states takes a variety of forms. In Alabama
it is simply to the effect that the process is believed necessary to obtain satis-
faction of the claim. In Arizona, New Mexico and Texas it is to the effect
that the defendant has not, to the knowledge of the affiant, property in his
possession in the state sufficient to satisfy the claim, and that the garnish-
ment applied for is not sued out to injure either the defendant or the garnishee.
In Georgia the affiant must have good reason to suppose that his claim, or some
part thereof, will be lost unless the process issue.
64. E.g., ALA. CODE (1928) § 8051; ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4258;
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919) § 4906; FLA. ComnP. LAwS
(1927) § 5286; GA. CODE ANN. (1926) § 5265 et scq; MINN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 9356; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 59-101 N. C. CODE (1931)
§ 719; N. D. Cohip. LAws ANN. (1913) § 7779; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926)
§ 11772; COmPLETE Tsx. STAT. (1928) art. 4076; V CODE ANN. (1930) § 6509.
65. E.g. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, North Cdrolina, North
Dakota and Ohio. See supra notes 63 and 64.
66. ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 61, § 1; Nsv. Co-i. LAWS (Hill-
yer, 1929) § 8746; N. Y. C. P. A. § 684; TENN. CODE (1932) 8946. In Maryland,
any plaintiff having a judgment may, instead of any other execution, issue
an attachment against the lands, tenements and credits of the defendant in
the plaintiff's own hands or of a third person. MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924)
art. 9, § 29.
67. KY. CODE ANN. (Carroll, 1927) Civ. Prac. § 439; S. C. CODE OF LAWS
(1932) § 746 et seq.
68. In the following states garnishment apparently reaches not only wages
which are absolutely due and payable to the principal defendant as of the
time of service of the process, but also wages which fall due up to the time
of the garnishee's answer. ALA. CODE (1928) § 8055; FLA. COMP. LAws (1927)
YALE LAW JOURNAL
York the writ of garnishment operates as a continuing levy until
the judgment is fully satisfied.6 9 And in California the lien endures
for three years after issuance.70
Wage exemptions in these two groups of states are on the whole
higher than those in the New England states. Wage exemptions of
the second group of states as compared with the first group do not
appear so much more favorable to debtors as to be significant upon
the variations of their wage earner bankruptcy totals, or upon the
increasing size of those totals. For convenience of reference they
are set forth here in tabular form, corresponding to Tables I and II,
supra.
Alabama 71  - $25 per month.
California 72  - earnings for personal services rendered within
thirty days where it appears that such earnings
are necessary for the support of the debtor's
family residing in the state. 50% against claims
for necessaries.
Georgia 73  - $1.25 per day of the daily, weekly or monthly wage
and 50% of the excess.
Illinois 74 - $20 per week to heads of families.
Kentucky 75  - 90% of wages up to and including $75 per month,
and $67.50 for salaries over $75 per month.
Massachusetts 76 - $20; $10 only as to claims for necessaries.
Minnesota 77  ,- $35 due for services rendered within thirty days.
New York7 8  - garnishee executions may reach only 10% of
wages of $12 or more per week.
Ohio79 - 90% of earnings not exceeding $75 for thirty
days, and 80% if the claim is for work or labor,
or necessaries, to heads of families.
§ 5289; GA. Coon ANN. (1926) §§ 5271, 5272; Nay. CoMP. LAWS (Hillyer,
1929) § 8731; N. M. STAT. ANN." (Courtright, 1929) §§ 59-116, 59-118; N. D.
ComP. LAws ANN. (1913) §§ 7574, 7575; N. C. CODE (1931) § 819 and Good-
win v. Claytor, 137 N. C. 224, 230-231, 49 S. E. 173 (1904) ; TENN. CODE (1932)
§§ 9433, 9435. And in Ohio, up to the time of the trial of the main action. OHIO
GN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11848. But in-Minnesota, only as of the time of
service of the process. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9361.
69. N. Y. C.P.A. § 684.
70. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoC. (Deering, 1931) § 542 b.
71. ALA. CODE (1928) § 7887.
72. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 690 (10).
73. GA. CODE ANN. (1926) § 5298.
74. ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 62, § 14.
75. KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 1697.
76. Supra note 53.
77. M NN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9447 (16).
78. N.Y.C.P.A. § 684.
79. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11725 (6).
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Tennessee 8 0  - 90% of wages of $40 or less per month and $35
of wages over $40 to heads of families.
Virginia 81 - $50 per month to heads of families.
Arizona 8 2  - 50% of wages for services rendered within thirty
days.
Arkansas 8 3  - wages for sixty days if less than the amount
exempt under the state constitution.
Delaware 8 4  - 90% of the wages of any person residing in New
Castle county, except where the levy is for board
or lodging and for an amount not exceeding $50.
District of - $100 per month to residents who support families
Columbia 8 5  in the District.
Florida SO - wages of heads of families wholly exempt.
Idaho8 7  - 75% of earnings for the preceding thirty days but
not over $100 at any one time, and 50% only if the
debt is for necessaries, where such earnings are
necessary to support a resident family.
Maryland 87a - $100 due.
Nevada 88  - same as California.
New Hampshire 89 - $20 except as to necessaries.
New Mexico 90 - 80% of wages up to $75 for the preceding thirty
days to heads of families except as to necessaries.
North Carolina 91 - wages for sixty days preceding the levy where
necessary for support of resident family.
North Dakota 92  - same as North Carolina.
Rhode Island 93  - $10 except as to necessaries.
80. TENN. CoDE (1932) § 7711.
81. VA. CoDE ANN. (1930) § 6555.
82. ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1738 (18).
83. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919) § 5546. Personal property
to the value of $200 is allowed as an exemption to unmarried persons, and to
the value of $500 to heads of families under the Arkansas Constitution, art.
IX, §§ 1, 2.
84. DEL. REV. STAT. (1915) § 4331.
85. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 24, § 313.
86. FLA. CoiP. LAws (1927) § 5792.
87. IDAHo CODE AwN. (1932) § 8-204 (7).
87a. M . ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 9, § 33.
88. NEv. CozaP. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 8844 (8).
89. Supra note 53.
90. N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 59-126.
91. N. C. CODE (1931) § 721.
92. N. D. ComP. LAws (1913) § 7782.
93. Supra note 52.
19331
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South Carolina 94 - same as North Carolina.
South Dakota 9 5 -
Texas 9 - current wages wholly exempt.
Wyoming 9 - 50% of wages for sixty days preceding the levy
where necessary for the support of a resident
family.
From this brief summary of the collection remedies of the states
in question available against wage and salary earner debtors and
wage or salary exemptions, it is not observable that they suggest
any Bankruptcy reforms which will reduce the totals or resolve the
variations in bankruptcy totals of the different states. Moreover,
quite clearly the wage earner bankruptcy totals of one state are more
numerous than they are in another state not by reason of the varia-
tions in their legal collection remedies and wage exemptions. Thus,
the wage earner bankruptcy totals of either Alabama, Ohio, or of
Tennessee are not greater than the aggregate of such bankrupts in the
total of the New England states because the collection remedies and
wage exemptions of Alabama, Ohio, or of Tennessee, are more adverse
to the debtor. On the other hand, there is no basis for the con-
clusion that a state makes a record of few wage earner bank-
ruptcies merely because its collection remedies or exemptions may be
more adverse to creditors. Witness, for example, Tennessee and
Arizona (Tennessee with 2474 wage earner bankruptcies in 1931,
Arizona with 24) with garnishments apparently more readily obtain-
able and wage exemptions not appreciably larger in Arizona. On the
other hand, these conclusions, of course, are without prejudice to a
conclusion that, in any or each state, collection procedures have a
significant bearing upon its wage and salary earner bankruptcies,
whether the totals are large or small.
Before dismissing this discussion of the significance, or rather,
lack of significance, of collection remedies and wage exemptions of
the several states in pointing the way to needed Bankruptcy reforms,
and the lack of correlation of these remedies and wage exemptions
with the varying, ever-increasing wage earner bankruptcy totals of
the states cited, reference should be made in this connection to assign-
94. S. C. CODE OF LAws (1932) § 750.
95. There is no wage exemption statute in South Dakota, The debtor may,
if the head of a family, select from his personal property not absolutely exempt,
goods, chattels, merchandise, money or other personal property, not to exceed
$750 in value; and if a single person, not the head of a family, to the value
of $300, which shall be exempt. S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 2659.
96. Tnx. REv. CIv. CoDE (1928) art. 4099.
97. Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) § 89-3125.
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ments of future wages and salaries. 3 While in legal contemplation
such assignments are lumped with general dogma relating to assign-
ments of rights, especially contract rights, or are regarded as financing
and security media, it seems that frequently they should be regarded
as a collection device, and, when they are used other than for purposes
in terrorem the debtor, that is, when they are actually served upon
the employer, their principal functions become that of collection
and of preferring the assignee-creditor in the collection process.
Looking upon such assignments and their availability as collec-
tion remedies under the laws of the several states, it is not ob-
servable that they point to any needed reforms of the Bankruptcy
Act or of its administration. Furthermore, it is quite clear that
the variations of wage and salary earner bankruptcy totals in the
several states are not to be accounted for by the legal restrictions,
if any, which are put upon their use in the several states. Thus,
in states with the smaller wage earner bankruptcy totals, as reported
supra, Table II, it may be observed that the District of Columbia,
Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina and South Dakota,
among other states, have no statutory provisions regulating or re-
stricting the use of wage or salary assignments.0 9 On the other
hand, among the states having the larger wage earner bankruptcy
totals, as reported supra, Table I, Alabama 10 and California,10' and
Ohio 1 0 2 in the case of employees of employers required to pay at
stated intervals, provide that assignments of future wages are void
with certain exceptions as to assignments given to secure the pur-
98. For a comprehensive discussion of the use and validity of wage as-
signments under the laws of the several states, see the article by Fortas, Wago
Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniturc Co. v. Ainour & Co. (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 526.
99. Among the other states in this group, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas and Wyoming regu-
late wage assignments only in connection with loans. See AmIz. CODE (Struck-
meyer, 1928) § 2012; AR. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919) § 7133; DMr.
LAws (1927) c. 208; FLA. GEN. LAWS (1927) § 4014; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby,
1924) art. 58 a; N. C. CODE (1931) § 4509; R. I. AcTs (1923) pp. 30-31;
Tsx REv. CIV. CODE (1928) art. 6165 a; Wyo. REV. STAT. (1931) §§ 8-101,
8-102. Of these, Arkansas, Maryland and Rhode Island, and, in addition, New
Hampshire and New Mexico have statutes regulating wage assignments other
than in connection with loans. See An. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919)
§ 7134; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 8, § 11; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923)
§4420 et seq; N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 327, § 3; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Court-
right, 1929) § 8-101.
100. ALA. CODE (1928) § 9232.
101. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 955.
102. OnIo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 12946 (1) (2).
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chase price of necessaries. 03 And in' Ohio, such an assignment,
up to 25% of the earner's wages if married and 50% if not married,
may be given to secure a loan, provided that it is in writing signed
by the borrower and consented to by his wife.10 4 In Massachusetts,
no assignments of unearned wages, other than those made to secure
loans of less than $300, are valid unless assented to by the em-
ployer.105 In Minnesota, every assignment of wages to be earned
requires the written consent of the employer and of the wife of
the employee, and is void if given for wages to be earned more than
60 days after execution.106  In the remaining jurisdictions of this
group there are special restrictions according to the statutes only
where the assignment is taken to secure a loan. Thus, in Illinois
future assignments of wages are restricted or regulated only when
given under the Small Loans Act; in such cases only 50% of the
wages assigned may be held thereunder. 0 7
It may also be observed, if it is important to note, that the legal
position of wage assignments after discharge in Bankruptcy of the
assigning wage earner varies in the several states. With the excep-
tion of Texas,108 the only states in the groups here considered where
the question has been passed upon are of the first group. Kentucky, 00
Minnesota 1"0 and Ohio M have held that the bankrupt's discharge
terminates his outstanding wage assignment. Illinois 112 and Massa-
103. In Alabama assignments of wages to be earned within 30 days may be
taken for the purchase price of certain enumerated necessities. ALA. CoDE
(1928) § 9233. Similarly, in California as to necessaries in general, except
that no time limit is prescribed. Supra note 100. In Ohio, 10o of such
earnings may be assigned to apply on a debt for necessaries. Supra note 101.
104. OHIO GEN. CODE (Supp. 1931) §§ 6346-11, 6346-12. The payment of
$300 or less in money, credit, goods or things in action as consideration for
the assignment is deemed a loan on salary or wages within the meaning of the
statute which applies only to licensees under Smal Loans Act.
105. MASs. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 154, §§ 2, 3, 4.
106. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 4136-4137. Assignments to secure
loans of less than $200 are regulated by § 4138.
107. ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 74, § 16. Other provisions
relating to assignments in connection with loans follow: GA. CODE ANN. (1926)
§§ 3465 and 1770; KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 4758-a-1 ot seq; N. Y. CONSOL.
LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 3, § 347; c. 42, § 42; VA. CODEs ANN. (1930) § 4168
(52) et seq.
108. See Leslie v. Roberts, 32 S. W. (2d) 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
109. Levi v. Loevenhart, 138 KY. 133, 127 S. W. 748 (1910).
110. Leitch v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 95 Minn. 35, 103 N. W. 704 (1905).
111. Rowe v. Public Finance Co., 37 Ohio App. 13, 174 N. E. 164 (1930).
The same result has been reached in Montana and Nebraska and in the federal
courts generally. See Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago--Stato Street
Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 42 YALE L. J. 526, notes 76, 77.
112. Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 285 I11. 233, 120
N. E. 743 (1918).
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chusetts 113 have held the contrary. But this variation cannot be made
to account for the variation in bankruptcy totals.
This brief review of assignments of future wages is adequate, it
is believed, to support reiteration of the point that the varying
restrictions or lack of restrictions upon their use under the laws of
the several states do not account for the variations in the wage and
salary earner bankruptcy totals of the several states nor for the in-
creasing size of those totals. In a given state they may be used with
facility yet its wage and salary earner banicruptcy totals may be low;
in another state their use may involve formal prerequisites and other
legal restrictions but the wage and salary earner bankruptcy totals of
the state may be high.
By way of summary upon the views here advanced respecting the
correlation of collection remedies, including assignments of future
wages and salaries, with wage and salary. earner bankruptcies, it
is concluded: (1) That compelling collection proceedings may well
have been a "contributing factor" to the decision of our wage and
salary earner bankrupts to file their petition in bankruptcy; (2) that
notwithstanding the relation of wage and salary earner bankruptcies
to collection remedies, as conceded in point (1), there is no significant
correlation between the variations in the collection remedies of the
several states and the increases and state to state variations of wage
and salary earner bankruptcy totals; (3) that propositions regarding
the impact of collection proceedings upon bankruptcy totals stop short
of the problems of credit administration implicit in those totals, and,
of course, fail to indicate the possible use of collection procedures
and the Bankruptcy Act as coperative instrumentalities of credit
control.
The Problems of Credit Management Implicit In Our Wage and
Salary Earner Bankruptcies-Necessary Reforms
From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that the writers'
criticisms of proposals to amend the Bankruptcy Act are not based
upon fears of what might be accomplished by so doing. Instead,
they are based upon convictions that such a program is, for the most
part, too remote from the more important credit problems implicit in
our wage and salary earner bankruptcies to bring about any sub-
stantial improvement.
The particular amendments proposed by the Attorney General,
as heretofore briefly reviewed, tell the populace once more that
113. Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Boston & Maine Rr. Co., 196 Mass. 528, 82
N. E. 696 (1907).
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honest and willing debtors will be accorded rights under the Bank-
ruptcy laws of the United States, and that culpable debtors will
be run down and punished by the Government. The Government
again champions honest and willing debtors and promises to punish
reprehensible debtors. This ideal classification, however, has ever
presented its difficulties. Most debtors see themselves in the ap-
proved class; most creditors are likely to consider that their de-
faulting debtors, especially their technically bankrupt debtors,
belong to the unapproved class. Moral judgments are required in
each case because the classes do not otherwise exist. There is little
probability that the officials provided for by the Attorney General's
proposed amendments would more effectively surmount these diffi-
culties of classification than have officials of the past in Bankruptcy
administration or in other fields of law administration. And, even
if there were such probability, the more important problems of
credit management implicit in our bankruptcy totals would still
remain, namely, (1) the elimination, or at least control, of the
sources of our defunct debtors, including technical bankrupts, and
(2) the stabilizing of outstanding credit extensions once they have
been made.
These problems of credit management implicit in our wage and
salary earner bankruptcies neither begin nor end with bankruptcies.
The "causes" of these bankruptcies do not arise at Bankruptcy.
Our commercial, credit and financial interests should realize that
Bankruptcy is neither the time nor the place to seek the stabiliza-
tion or validation of their receivables, nor to create judgments upon
the moralities of debtors.
It is proposed, therefore, in the present section of this article
briefly to examine these problems of credit management in their
more comprehensive aspects and, in so far as time elements may
be suggested, to give more attention to these problems at the origin-
ation rather than at the dissolution of credit extensions.
The problems of credit management relating to wage and salary
earners are the problems of management of the major part of our
consumer credit. Wages and salaries are the principal support for
that credit. Business, at production and throughout distribution,
looks forward to capturing these earnings. They are an indispensable
support of profits, rents and interest. These earnings are not an
unlimited fund-at least such has been our experience to date.114
As yet, they have not proved capable of unlimited expansion through
114. Of course, this is not intended, by implication even, to indicate tho
I writers' resignation to such formulae of politico-economic propaganda regard-




credit. Indeed, apparently in the case of a great number of their
recipients, these earnings are scarcely adequate for the subsistence
requirements of the earner and his dependents. 115
Notwithstanding this elementary learning regarding consumer
credit, we have witnessed, especially during the past decade, its
irresponsible inflation. Rising wage scales and pressure for new
outlets of increased production undoubtedly stimulated the exploita-
tion. This exploitation has been carried on by making credit a sales
accessory. "Easy" credit terms have been offered to strike down
"sales resistance." "Easy" credit terms have been translated into
longer and still longers terms under the general slogan, "Buy Today
-Pay Later." 116 Accordingly, the consumer has been taught lightly
to regard his credit undertakings-their ethical content being de-
based by those whose economic interests ever argued the perpetua-
tion of their moral sanctions. Accordingly, consumer credit has
become greater in volume and more and more widely diffused. Ac-
cordingly, earnings farther and farther in the future-an economi-
cally insecure and fragile future for so many earners-have been
burdened for purchases and loans.
Promotions to "Own Your Own Home," houses for installment
sales, finance companies, credit unions, pawnbrokers and personal
small loans companies with their wage earner accommodation paper,
chattel mortgages on household effects and wage assignments, have
built themselves upon this exploitation of future wages and salaries.
Established enterprises, heretofore conservative in their retail prac-
115. See, The Cost of Living in Twvelve Industrial Cities, National Industrial
Conference Board (1928), PAUL H. DOUGLAS, WAGES AND THE FAMLY (1925);
Reed, The Ability to Pay for Medical Care, Publication No. 25, Committee on
the Cost of Medical Care (1932); Cost of Living in the Unitcd States, Bull.
No. 357, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Labor (1924); Douglas,
Wage Earner Bank ruptcies-State vs. Federal Control (1933) 42 YAIi L. J.
591, 628-638. See also, Sturges, Whither Do We Wander (Jan. 6, 1931) CON-
NECGTICUT SAFE DEPosr ASS'N QUART. BULL. 7; id. (1931) 20 SAFE DEosrr
BULL. (N. Y.) No. 6, p. 305.
116. See Noyes, Financing Prosperity on Next Year's Income (1927) 16
YALE REvEW 227; Lester, A Dollar Down and Ten To Go: The Pros and Cons
of Installment Credit (1928) 61 SURvEY 133; Living and Dying on Installmcnts
(1925) 50 WORLD's WORK 575; Hawthorne Daniel, Living and Dying on In-
stallments (1926) 51 WoRLD's WORK 320; Too Much Credit Not Good for the
Worker, LITERARY DIGEST, August 1, 1925 at 62; Frederick, Dollar-Down
Serfdom (1926) 117 INDEPENDENT 299; EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE
CONSUER (1930) c. II. Cf. Strengthening of Procedure in the Judicial System,
supra note 5, at 85, n. 59.
Of course, in terms of the dollar-volume of such sales, this exploitation has
not reached the lowest brackets of earnings. Personal small loan enterprise
have extended farther into this "market." See EvANs CLARK, op. cit. oupra.
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tices, have been forced to follow the innovations of their more
aggressive competitors.
Commercial, credit and financial interests should recognize not
only that Bankruptcy laws are neither responsible 1 for such in-
flationary exploitation of consumer credit nor a cure for it, but also
that to stabilize and validate consumer credit they must put in order
their own practices, particularly their own consumer sales and credit
practices. Let these interests, therefore, undertake anew to educate
themselves to the conservation, rather than to the irresponsible
exploitation, of consumer credit. May they come to know again
that the sources of consumer payments are not without limit. May
they learn anew that the several classes of credit-grantors have a
community of interest in their common debtor; that those who sell
with security as well as those who sell upon open account are seek-
ing to charge a common source of payment which, at least as yet,
has never proved to be unlimited or capable of indefinite expansion.
Let these interests learn once more that over-exploited credit-grants
are the surest breeders of bankruptcies-technical, or otherwise.
As recognition is again accorded the fact that consumer earnings
(and savings when there are any) are not unlimited or capable of
indefinite expansion, costs of consumer credit should be scrutinized
anew. Let the new consumer credit promotions be predicated upon
the ability of the buyer or borrower to earn and pay-not only the
nominal price or principal, but also the veiled costs of the credit, such
as refinancing or "renewal" charges, "carrying charges" and "inter-
est"-these in addition to costs of operation and maintenance of the
thing acquired. In this connection our commercial, credit and finan-
cial interests should also re-examine the striking development of the
personal small loans business which is sustained by slogans about
"humanitarian purposes" and "sound economic principles." "a
More specifically, let them re-examine whether or not constantly
accumulating interest charges upon its millions, and probably
billions, of dollars of loans to earners generally qualifying to borrow
,only from $50 to $200,119 at such rates as 3 % per month upon
unpaid balances, authorized under the Uniform Small Loans Act,
are conducive to a stable or healthy consumer market or consumer
credit.
Our commercial, credit and financial interests should also recog-
nize once more that exploitation of the consumer market through
117. Suggestions (see op. cit. supra note 5, at 9) that the bankruptcy law
"encourages reckless extravagance and facilitates fraud" (italics ours) aro
high-sounding and arouse the emotions, but misleading as sign posts to of-
ective methods of reform.
118. See EVANS CLARK, op. cit. supra note 116.
119. Id. at 60-62.
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sales for cash can have its impact upon savings and earnings of
the consumer and can destroy outstanding credit grants soundly
extended. Cunning of advertising and pressure in salesmanship
for cash sales are not without their costs to stability of the consumer
market and consumer credit.
If these observations encourage their own criticism as over-
emphasizing, by implication at least, the short-comings of the com-
mercial, credit and financial interests here addressed without regard
for the short-comings of the consumer, including his extravagance
and incompetence respecting family finances, let it be so. The problem
is not one of "blame," but rather one of inducing reform by those
who have the power of reform-by those who have the power to
control our consumer market and credit.'-0
If and as commercial, credit and financial interests shall under-
take thus to discipline themselves in the conservation and stabiliza-
tion of consumer credit, it is submitted that state legislatures and
the Congress can effectively co6perate with them by enacting two
comparatively simple pieces of legislation. This legislation, how-
ever, should be understood as intended primarily to aid commercial,
credit and financial interests in helping themselves to discipline their
members in fair and sound practices relating to consumer credit.
It can be no cure of its own force. Its effectiveness would depend
very directly upon the extent to which these interests should use it
for such purposes. It would not serve as an eradicator of bank-
ruptcies. It is conceived as a co6perating agency for credit control.
Proposals To Aid in Codperative Credit Control
The two proposals should be considered as an entirety respecting
purpose and effect, namely, to repeat, as an aid'to credit control.
In enumerating them separately and in referring only the second
proposal to Congress for incorporation in the Bankruptcy Act, while
both are submitted for state enactment, their entirety of purpose
should not be obscured.
120. It is thoroughly realized that by identifying these interests as holding"
the power of consumer stabilization, the complex problems of executing that
power are not solved. These problems are neither few nor simple, a realization
which is vitalized as the present so-called depression wears on. By the same
token, however, it may be reiterated that these problems will not be resolved
by the passing of a law-even amending the Bankruptcy Act-or by changing
the personnel charged with its administration.
Even with respect to "fraudulent" and culpable borrowers and buyers on
credit, these responsibilities of credit management cannot be effectively
shifted to bankruptcy or other statutory officials. They cannot be expected
substantially to reward creditors for irresponsible volumes of widely diffused
credit-grants. See note 20, supra.
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The proposals to aid in enforcing this cobperative conservation
of consumer credit are as follows:
I. (a) That state legislation be enacted whereby any creditor
(other than a secured creditor suing merely to foreclose or to re-
claim upon default) who shall institute an action to collect a money
claim, shall share any liens arising by attachment, garnishment or
judgment which he may acquire thereby, with any and all other
creditors of the defendant, existing at the time, who shall, after
notice, and within a prescribed time thereafter, file and prove their
claims.
(b) That any assignment of wages or salary shall be treated as
prescribed in (a).
II. In co~peration with the foregoing state legislation seeking
to enable creditors to enforce regard for the mutuality of interest
of creditors in their common debtor with respect to collection pro-
ceedings, let the state legislatures, and Congress in the Bankruptcy
Act, provide a new order of priorities among general creditors.
Let it be enacted that general unsecured creditors (in Bankruptcy
those having "provable claims"), and secured claims as respects
any deficiency, shall rank according to the date of their respective
credit extensions.
It is believed that the state legislation involved in Proposal I is
consistent with and in furtherance of existing commercial policies
which have already been promoted by some wholesale trade organ-
izations with respect to their retail dealers. These wholesalers ha~ie
recognized their common interest in retailers who maintain business
relations with two or more of them. Thus, the by-laws of the New
Haven Branch of the Wholesale Grocers Association provide as
follows: "Paragraph II, The Object: The object of this organization
shall be to protect and promote the financial interests of its members
by preventing failure when possible and by cooperating in bank-
ruptcy cases in which its members are concerned, and it is under-
stood and agreed that in case attachment or other proceedings are
necessary locally for the protection of the assets of any debtor, such
action shall be taken through the attorney of this organization for
the benefit and in the interest of all members of the organization."
(Italics ours).
As wholesalers find a community of interest in their retail out-
lets, retailers, together with other commercial and credit interests,
may likewise organize and recognize a community of interest in a
consumer debtor. But trade organizations may have their limita-
tions in enforcing this mutuality of creditor-interest by the fact
that their by-laws do not function against non-members and by
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reason of the fact that a single person may well become debtor to
the members of more than one organization.
Proposal I should aid in meeting these limitations and in enforcing
among creditors more comprehensive application of the principle
of interdependence.
Assignments of future wages and salaries should be regarded as
a collection device of like import as attachment or garnishment for
purposes of the "underfiling" (that is, proving of claims under the
-original process) and proration here proposed. Depending upon their
continuation, they may be even more anti-social to the common
interests of all other creditors than garnishment.
Such assignments may be made effective for purposes of under-
filing and sharing by a provision that, upon service of such an
assignment upon an employer, such employer shall certify as to the
-employment of the assignor and return the assignment to a desig-
nated court. The court, or clerk thereof should thereupon, for pur-
poses of underfiling and proration proceedings, proceed as upon the
return of an attachment or garnishment or the procurement of a
judgment. In the meantime accruing wages should be paid in full
by the employer to the court to which the assignment was properly
returned.
The community-of-creditor-interest here sought to be enforced is
that resulting from the elimination of preferences gained by legal
proceedings or assignment whereby one credit-grantor, in utter dis-
regard of the outstanding credit of other credit-grantors, can scalp
the common, and, all too frequently, sole source of payment of the
debtor's several obligations. Such a reward for "diligence" in col-
lection is too high a price to be imposed upon the others. Such
a reward unnecessarily tolerates speculative and irresponsible
credit-grants.
It may be conceded that some lawyers will oppose such a social-
ization of collection processes.' The game of preference-scalping
through collection proceedings and assignment is thereby taken
away. Others, probably, would be more tolerant of the proposal.=
121. That a similar policy obtains in some states under statutes granting
receiverships of corporations for designated causes, see Parten v. Southern
Colonization Co., 146 Minn. 287, 178 N. W. 744 (1920); Clark, Receivers at
the Instance of Judgment Creditors and Priorities Incident Thereto (1930) 17
VA. L. Rnv. 54 et seq.
122. An analogous legal philosophy and morality may be observed in the
fiduciary relationship which courts have enjoined upon creditors who become
parties to a composition agreement with their debtor. See Hanover National
Bank v. Blake, 142 N. Y. 404, 37 N. E. 519 (1894); Kullman v. Greenebaum, 92
Cal. 403, 28 Pac. 674 (1891); Klaw v. Famous Players-Lasky Corporation,
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It remains to point out that some jurisdictions already provide
for proration under attachments and garnishment. 1 23 The Indiana
statute may be quoted for illustrative purposes. Pertinent sections
are as follows:
"1014. Any creditor of the defendant, upon filing his affidavit and written
undertaking, as hereinbefore required of the attaching creditor, may, at
207 App. Div. 211, 201 N. Y. Supp. 691 (1st Dep't 1923); In re Chaplin, 116
Fed. 162 (D. Mass. 1902).
123. CoLo. ComP. LAws (1921) §§ 99-101; IDAHO CODn ANN. (1932) §§6-501
-6-503; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 1014-1015, 1010-1020; PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 2747 (domestic attachments).
An Illinois statute provides that "all judgments in attachments against the
same defendant, returnable at the same term, and all judgments in suits by
summons, capias or attachment against such defendant, recovered at that
term or at the term when the judgment shall be recovered is rendered, shall
share pro rata ---- in the proceeds of the property attached, either in the hands
of a garnishee or otherwise," with a proviso, however, that when the property
is attached while the defendant is removing the same or after it has been
removed from the county and is overtaken and returned, or while it is secreted
by the defendant or put out of his hands for the purpose of defrauding his
creditors, the court may allow the creditor or creditors through whose diligence
it was secured a priority. ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 11, § 37.
Provision is also made in the statutes of Delaware and New Jersey for
other creditors to apply under an attachment, and for the appointment of
"auditors" to ascertain their claims and distribute the proceeds. DEL. REv.
STAT. (1915) §§ 4132-4133; N. J. CoMP. LAws (1910) § 6, p. 136, et scq; id.
(Supp. 1924) § 21, p. 101. In Delaware, creditors attaching and prosecuting
the same to judgment are allowed a double share, or dividend, upon distribu-
tion, if such shall not exceed their debt; and in New Jersey, the plaintiff in
the original attachment receives payment of his claim in full first, the residue,
if any, being prorated among the other creditors whose debts have been allowed.
Under the New Jersey procedure the "auditor" has broad powers as to the
discovery of the defendant's property; he may issue warrants for the seizure of
money, goods, papers, etc., of the defendant and may sue for debts owing to
the defendant. Similar powers are given to "trustees' in Pennsylvania. PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 2791 et seq.
Formerly, in Florida, § 9 of the act of Feb. 1833 (DIG. FLA. LAws (1822-
1881) c. 7, § 18) which provided, inter alia, that "the judgment in a suit
commenced by attachment, shall be satisfied in the same manner as other
judgments obtained in the same term of the Court are, or shall be, satisfied,
out of the lands and tenements, goods and chattels generally of the defendant
in attachment," was held to place "judgments obtained at the same term,
whether the suits in which they were obtained were instituted by attachment
or ordinary summons, upon the same footing," that is, such judgments should
be satisfied pro rata. Post v. Carpenter, 3 Fla. 1, 3 (1850); Smith v. Bowden,
23 Fla. 150 (1887). The statute now in force, however, provides that "levies
upon the same property under successive attachments shall have precedence
as liens in the order in which they are made." FLA. COMP. LAws (1927) § 5269.
A similar procedure obtains in France. See CODD DE1 PR0CLDURE CIVIL, arts.
656-672 (Petits Codes Carpentier, 1929); CODs DU TRAVAIL, arts. 70-70 C, an
amended by Law of July 27, 1921 (Petite Collection Dalloz, 1931).
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any time before the final judgment in the suit, make himself a party to
the action, file his complaint, and prove his claim or demand against the
defendant; and may have any person summoned as garnishee, or held
to bail, who had not before been summoned or held to bail; and propound
interrogatories to the garnishee, and enforce answers thereto, in like
manner as the creditor who is plaintiff."
"1015. A dismissal of his action or proceedings in attachment by the
first attaching creditor shall not operate as a dismissal of the action or
proceedings of any subsequent attaching creditor."
"1018. If judgment in the action be rendered for the plaintiff, or one
or more of several plaintiffs, and sufficient proof be made of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, moneys and effects in possession of the garnishee,
the court shall also give judgment in favor of the plaintiff as creditors
against the garnishee or the property of the defendant, or both, as the
case may require; which may be enforced by execution."
"1019. After judgment for the plaintiff, or one or more of several plain-
tiffs, property attached and remaining unsold may be sold on execution,
as.in other cases."
"1020. The money realized from the attachment and the garnishees shall,
under the direction of the court, after paying all costs and expenses, be
paid to the general creditors in proportion to the amount of their several
claims as adjusted, and the surplus, if any, shall be paid to the defendant."
Other statutes are more exacting, and properly so it would seem,
in requiring notice of the attachment for the benefit of other creditors
who may wish to underfile. Thus, the Idaho statute requires that
"two days after issuing such writ of attachment [of the original
attaching creditor] and delivering it to the proper officer, the clerk
must post at the front door of the court house and cause to be pub-
lished in some newspaper published in the county, . . . a notice,
setting out the title of the cause and the fact that an attachment
has been issued against the property of the defendant. Such notice
shall be kept posted at least ten days and shall be published, if in
a weekly paper in three issues thereof, and if any other than a
weekly paper, in at least six issues."
Under these statutes, any creditor, as well as the debtor, may
contest the claim of any other creditor.- 4 Even the claim of the
original attaching creditor may be challenged and eliminated with-
out destroying the attachment and proceedings thereunder as
respects the underfiling creditors. Thus, it has been held that pay-
124. The U. S. Express Co. v. Lucas, 36 Ind. 361 (1871); Lytle v. Lytle, 37
Ind. 281 (1871); Rouse v. Wallace, 10 Colo. App. 93 (1897). See also,
Schmidt v. Colley, 29 Ind. 120 (1867); Compton v. Crone, 58 Ind. 106 (1877).
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ment in full of the attaching creditor's claim does not dissolve the
attachment as against the underfiling creditors.12
Creditors entitled to prorate under an attachment share in the,
lien from the date of the original attachment.12 Total claims al-
lowed are fixed for payment in the order for the execution sale.12r
No discharge of unproved claims or of unpaid balances is provided
in the statute. Any sum realized upon the execution sale in excess
of claims proved and allowed in the order of sale is returned to the,
defendant.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has observed upon the general
purpose of its statute as follows: "It is the purpose of our statute,
to secure a distribution of the debtor's property among all the at-
taching creditors, and not to permit it to be absorbed by the claim
of the creditor who sues out the first writ." 128
In sustaining the constitutionality of the Idaho statute, the Su-
preme Court of Idaho remarked as follows:
"In support of the argument touching the constitutional question, it is-
insisted that an attachment lien gives a creditor a vested right in the
property, . . . and that, therefore, since the statute provides no notice
or proceeding against the first attaching creditor, the prorating provision
deprives the latter of his property without due process of law and deprives,
him of the equal protection of the law. If counsel's first position were
entirely correct, his latter contention might present a debatable point,
but it should be remembered in this connection that the lien of an attach-
ment proceeding such as we have under the Code was unknown at common
law, and that being entirely statutory it is within the province of the
legislature to place any restrictions upon the extent of the right of an,
attaching creditor which it deems advisable.
"Under attachment statutes containing a prorating provision, the at-
taching creditor does not get an unqualified vested lien, but the lien that
he does take by virtue of his attachment is taken subject to the provision
that under certain circumstances other creditors who proceed to judgment
and come within the terms of the statute will be entitled to share in the
proceeds of the attached property, pro rata. The prorating provision does,
not deprive the attaching creditor of a vested right and we, therefore,
125. Stone v. Jones 4 Harr. 255. (Del. 1843); Zeigenhager v. Doe on the
Demise of Strong, 1 Ind. (Carter) 296 (1848); Ryan v. Burkam, 42 Ind. 507
(1873); Cummins v. Blair, 18 N. J. L. 151 (1840). See also, Taylor v. Elliott.
51 Ind. 375 (1875). Cf. Trentman v. Wiley, 85 Ind. 33 (1882).
126. Shirk v. Wilson, 13 Ind. 129 (1859). And consult Plunkett v. Moore,
4 Harr. 379 (Del. 1843).
127. Consult Henderson v. Bliss, 8 Ind. 100 (1856); Cooper v. Metzger, 74
Ind. 544 (1881); Lex. R. R. Co.,v. Ford Plate Glass Co., 84 Ind. 516 (1882) ,
E. I. DuPont v. Pennsylvania & Indiana Coal Co., 69 Ind. App. 320, 121 N. E.
680 (1919).
128. Lex. R. R. Co. v. Ford Plate Glass Co., supra note 127, at 519.
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hold that the constitutional provisions securing due process of law and
equal protection of the law are not involved." 123
It was also held in the same case that the proration statute was
not suspended by the Bankruptcy Act as being a state insolvency
or bankruptcy law.
It may be, noted that the procedure for underfiling and sharing,
which is here proposed, involves no special oppression of the
debtor.130 Indeed it should tend to his advantage with respect to
costs. Pertinent to this point, the Supreme Court of Idaho may
be quoted: "'Under the prorating statute it is unnecessary for any
of the subsequent creditors to attach, the theory being that the first
attachment holds the property for the benefit of all creditors . . .
and they are relieved from the responsibility, and the debtor from
the costs, of the prosecution or suing out of additional attachment
process." ' 31 The Supreme Court of Indiana has made similar ob-
servations in this connection.132
By way of general summary upon Proposal I: It is believed that
the procedure for underfiling and sharing here recommended
would aid creditors of a common debtor in enforcing against each
other their mutual and common interest in their debtor and his
sources of payment. This socialization of collection remedies, includ-
ing wage and salary assignments, should work as a restraining
influence upon sellers and lenders in promoting credit sales or loans.
They should then realize that under such collection proceedings as
are here recommended they may not sell or lend in disregard of
outstanding commitments of the debtor and scalp full collection by
claiming as the "reward of diligence" the priority which an earlier
attachment, garnishment, assignment or even a judgment now gives
in most jurisdictions.
This first proposal will be aided to these ends by the coiiperation
of the second proposal. The second proposal, namely, that priorities
shall be given in collection proceedings and in Bankruptcy to general
129. Greene v. Rice, 32 Idaho 504, 509, 186 Pac. 249, 250 (1919).
130. Only claims maturing on or before the expiration of the time for
underfiling may be proved in these proceedings. See Ziegenhager v. Doe on
the Demise of Strong, supra note 125. Fixed money claims, absolutely owing
and readily discountable, should, however, be provable. See PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 2835; CoLO. CoAmP. LAws (1921) § 105.
131. Greene v. Rice, 32 Idaho 504, 511, 186 Pac. 249, 251 (1919). See also,
Kimball v. Raymond, 9 Idaho 176, 72 Pac. 957 (1903).
An underfiling creditor should not be required to serve separate summons
upon the debtor any more than upon the other creditors. Schmidt v. Colley,
supra note 124. Consult also E. I. DuPont Co. v. Pennsylvania & Indiana
Coal Co., 48 Ind. App. 538, 96 N. E. 204 (1911). But cf. Trinidad Bank v.
Jamieson Co., 60 Colo. 356, 153 Pac. 441 (1915).
132. See Ziegenhager v. Doe on the Demise of Strong, supra note 125.
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unsecured creditors according to the order in which they granted
credit to a common debtor is recommended as a further aid to com-
mercial, credit and financial interests in enforcing their community
of interest among credit-grantors in a common debtor. This new
order of priorities should, in connection with Proposal I, warn each
potential credit-grantor against disregarding existing obligations
and surcharging the debtor with additional burdens of debt. All
too- frequently, stable retail credit obligations, predicated upon con-
servative credit extensions, are brought to default or bankruptcy
because a subsequent credit-grantor indulges first in high pressure
salesmanship whereby the debtor is over-sold and then in ruthless
collection methods. The matter has been modestly expressed as
follows: "The creditors themselves are not infrequently to blame
for the losses incurred. Credit is often extended carelessly and
without adequate inquiry, or with the expectation that profits from
the increased volume of sales will exceed probable credit losses. The
consequences of modern salesmanship striving to expand sales re-
gardless of credit risk by encouraging persons of moderate means
to make purchases on credit which they can ill afford are undoubt-
edly reflected in the deplorable statistics of bankruptcy. Unfortu.
nately the losses resulting from such methods do not fall exclusively
upon those who are at fault but must be shared by the creditors
equally,
"The situation is well illustrated in the case of wage earners
who, in large numbers, seek discharge from their debts in bank-
ruptcy because they have been induced by one group of creditors
at the expense of another to buy luxuries which they cannot afford.
These debtors either because of the more active collection methods
of dealers in luxuries or in order to retain property sold to them
under conditional sales contracts, often satisfy their debts owing
for luxuries and seek discharge in bankruptcy from debts owing
to the butcher, the baker, the grocer and the doctor, who had no
part in bringing about their insolvency." 133
It is submitted that an ordering of priorities as here recom-
mended, in connection with provisions for underfiling and sharing
involved in Proposal I, would materially aid in protecting "the
butcher, the baker, the grocer and the doctor, who had no part in
bringing about" the consumer's insolvency and default.
By way of summary:
(1) Our ever increasing number of wage and salary earner bank-
ruptcies are, in terms of reforms, most significant of needs for
reform in the management of consumer credit.
133. Op. cit. supra note 5, at 8-9 (italics supplied).
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(2) That reforms of Bankruptcy laws and their admini tration
promise little relief and less cure.
(3) That the management of consumer credit and its reforms
are for the most part problems of internal discipline of and by
commercial, credit and financial interests.
(4) That only to a very limited extent can legislation enforce
upon commercial, credit and financial interests the desired conser-
vation of consumer credit.
(5) In co6peration with such interests, it is submitted that state
legislation and the proposed amendment of the Bankruptcy Act can
aid these ends by socializing collection proceedings and imposing
upon credit grantors who disregard the community of interest of
creditors in a common debtor such a penalty as may inhere in such
socialization and the priorities which are here recommended.
(6) That such recommendations are not conceived as an eradi-
cator of consumer bankrupts; and they do not imply that bankruptcy
reforms are not desirable to the end that creditors' losses from
debtors' estates which doubtlessly are inevitable under the best credit
management may be reduced.
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